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1 Introduction 
The universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights 
have been affirmed internationally, for example, in the 1968 Declaration of Tehran1 
and in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.2 However, despite 
rhetorical affirmations, there has been a continued prioritisation of the protection of 
civil and political rights at the expense of socio-economic rights,3 with international 
monitoring bodies dealing with civil and political rights adopting Optional Protocols 
mandating them to receive and consider individual communications for their 
violation, while such a mechanism has for a long time been lacking for the 
vindication of violations of socio-economic rights.4 Even in instances where some 
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1  Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights (1968) para 13, which states that 
"[s]ince human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and 
political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, is impossible". 
2  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) para 5, which further states that "[t]he 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis". 
3  The term "socio-economic rights" is used here to denote those rights encompassing the basic 
necessities of life. These rights have traditionally been distinguished from "civil and political" 
rights because they are viewed as imposing particular fulfilment obligations on states, an issue 
which often gives rise to arguments about resource constraints and progressive realisation. 
Cultural rights are in our view quite discreet from "socio-economic rights" and we therefore avoid 
bundling them all together as "economic, social and cultural rights". 
4  The international legal instruments providing for individual communication mechanisms for CPRs 
include the following: First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) aa 1-6; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (1999) a 1; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (2006) a 1; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965) a 14; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
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available international mechanisms have a corollary possibility of adjudicating socio-
economic rights on the basis that the relevant substantive international legal 
instruments contain both civil and political and socio-economic rights - such as those 
created under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) - communications alleging the 
violation of socio-economic rights have seldom been adjudicated by these 
mechanisms. Due to the disparities in the international enforcement of socio-
economic rights compared to that of civil and political rights;5 the continued 
adjudication of socio-economic rights at the domestic and regional levels leading to 
the elaboration of clearer content and obligations emanating from socio-economic 
rights;6 and the recommendations emanating from the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights for the continued examination of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,7 
concerted steps were undertaken to adopt an individual communications mechanism 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).8 
These efforts culminated in the drafting and adoption of an Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR on 5 March 2009.9 It subsequently entered into force on 5 May 2013, three 
months after the tenth ratification had been deposited by Uruguay.10 By 31 May 
2014, 45 states had signed the OP-ICESCR, but only 14 have become State 
Parties.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) a 21; International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990) a 77. 
5  IAIHR and ICJ 2010 http://www.crin.org/docs/ENG-CommentaryOP-ICESCR.pdf 21. 
6  For a comprehensive analysis evidencing the adjudication of socio-economic rights at the 
domestic and regional levels, see generally Langford Social Rights Jurisprudence. 
7  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) para 75. 
8  See generally, Arambulo 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L & Pol'y 111-136; Chenwi 2009 AHRLJ 23-51; De 
Albuquerque 2010 Hum Rts Q 144-178; Langford 2009 NJHR Special Issue 1-129; Mahon 2008 
HRL Rev 621-628; Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 207-237. 
9  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2009) 
(hereafter OP-ICESCR). 
10  See OP-ICESCR, a 18, which provides that the Protocol is to enter into force three months after 
the deposit of the 10th instrument of ratification or accession. Uruguay was the tenth state to 
ratify, which it did on 5 February 2013. Apart from Uruguay, the countries that have also ratified 
the Optional Protocol include: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Mongolia, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. See UN Treaty 
Collection 2014 http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en. 
11  See the list of ratifying States in the footnote above. 
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The process of drafting an Optional Protocol for the ICESCR was not easy, however, 
with its opponents contending that it had not been demonstrated that an individual 
complaints mechanism for socio-economic rights would be practical, effective and 
worthwhile.12 In the context of this debate, Dennis and Stewart13 raised the 
following concerns in relation to the drafting of the Optional Protocol: 
 Can the treaty obligations assumed by States Parties under the ICESCR be 
measured, quantified, and applied in a meaningful way?  
 Can the review standards be the same for all countries (regardless of their levels 
of development) and, if not, how will such distinctions be made? 
 How would States Parties be able to demonstrate their levels of achievement in 
response to individual complaints? 
 How would a legally binding adjudicative regime improve States Parties' 
implementation of socio-economic rights?  
 Would a complaints mechanism under the ICESCR add meaningfully to the 
mechanisms and procedures already available in other international complaints 
regimes? 
They further argued that an international adjudicatory mechanism would limit the 
necessary discretion of States in dealing with disparate domestic situations, with the 
resultant effect that States would de-emphasise the importance of socio-economic 
rights, thus undermining their stature and acceptability.14 
Despite these challenges, the notion of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR garnered 
sufficient support to allow for its adoption and entry into force. In relation to the 
individual communications mechanism, it states as follows:15 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol 
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications as provided for by the provisions of the present Protocol. 
This article seeks to explore the importance of the individual communications 
mechanism under the Optional Protocol; it interrogates whether the ratification of 
the Optional Protocol has practical benefits for a State party and its citizens; and it 
considers the implications for States of its ratification. It is divided into six 
interrelated sections. After this brief introduction the paper undertakes an analysis of 
the provisions of the Optional Protocol in section 2. It then delves into a discussion 
                                                          
12  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 464. 
13  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 464-465. 
14  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 467.  
15  OP-ICESCR a 1. 
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of the importance of the individual communications mechanism under the Optional 
Protocol as well as some of the possible challenges to the effectiveness of the 
individual communications mechanism under the Option Protocol in sections 3 and 4 
respectively. It advances some arguments why South Africa should accede to the 
Optional Protocol in section 5, and ends with some brief concluding remarks in 
section 6. 
2 Understanding the individual communications mechanism under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
The Optional Protocol is based on certain fundamental principles that have been the 
mainstay of the human rights and fundamental freedoms regime since the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These principles include: inherent 
dignity as well as the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings;16 freedom 
from fear and want;17 the universality, indivisibility, interrelatedness and 
interdependence of rights;18 and the standard of progressive realisation to the 
maximum of available resources through national efforts and through international 
cooperation and assistance.19 The Optional Protocol mandates the CESCR to receive 
and consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals who are 
victims of the violations of any of the socio-economic rights contained in the ICESCR 
from State Parties to the ICESCR who have similarly ratified or acceded to the 
Protocol.20 This comprehensive approach, taken together with the full inclusion of 
article 2(1) of the ICESCR in the preamble of the Optional Protocol,21 entrenches the 
requirement that the examination of individual communications under the Protocol 
must be consonant with the normative legal standards established by the ICESCR.22 
                                                          
16  OP-ICESCR preambular paras 1-2. 
17  OP-ICESCR preambular para 3. 
18  OP-ICESCR preambular para 4. 
19  OP-ICESCR preambular para 5.  
20  OP-ICESCR preambular para 6 and aa 1-2. Where communications are submitted on behalf of 
victims of ESCR violations, this must be done with their consent unless other justifications exist. 
Also see Provisional Rules of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2012) Rule 4 (hereafter the Provisional 
Rules). 
21  OP-ICESCR preambular para 5. 
22  Griffey 2011 HRL Rev 279. 
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This, of course, makes the jurisprudence emanating from the work of the CESCR in 
the use of its reporting mandate, especially the General Comments interpreting the 
rights entrenched in the ICESCR, important resources in the determination of 
communications under the Optional Protocol.23 
For a communication to be admissible under the Optional Protocol, it must meet the 
following requirements:24 
 Local remedies, which are not unduly prolonged, must have been exhausted.25 
 The communication must be submitted within one year after exhaustion of local 
remedies, unless it is demonstrated that this was reasonably impractical.26 
 It must deal with events occurring after the entry into force of the Protocol for a 
specific State Party, unless the violation is of a continuing nature. 
 The same facts must not have been considered or be under consideration in 
another international procedure of investigation and settlement.27 
 It must be compatible with the ICESCR. 
 It must be substantively and sufficiently founded, and not based exclusively on 
media reports. 
 It must be in writing and must indicate the author.28 
 It should not be an abuse of the communication process. 
 Communications not revealing that an author has suffered a clear disadvantage 
may be declined unless the author demonstrates that it raises serious issues of 
general importance.29 This provision was influenced by Protocol 14 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.30 
                                                          
23  Griffey 2011 HRL Rev 280-290. 
24  OP-ICESCR, a 3. 
25  The use of this provision must of necessity take into account the development of international 
law in the area of exhaustion of domestic remedies, which requires that only effective remedies 
be exhausted. 
26  See Langford 2009 NJHR 23, who suggests that this may be a retrogressive provision which is 
most likely to adversely affect claimants from States without domestic remedies for the violation 
of socio-economic rights, as they are less likely to be aware of the existence of the available 
international options. He thus recommends that, for the communications procedure to overcome 
this challenge, awareness-raising concerning the Optional Protocol is critical. 
27  Some of the relevant regional mechanisms in Africa that have ESCR's mandate and that must be 
considered in this instance include the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights and 
the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. See the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (1981) aa 55-56, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998) a 3. 
28  Also see the Provisional Rules Rule 1(3). 
29  OP-ICESCR a 4. This was a mechanism inserted to enable the CESCR to distinguish between 
cases and to enable it to concentrate only on cases demonstrating serious and widespread 
violation of socio-economic rights, should there be an overload of communications. See 
Kratochvil 2009 Hum Rts Br 30-31, who contends that being only a procedural criterion, it should 
not be used unless the CESCR is overwhelmed with cases to the point that it makes the 
individual communications and treaty monitoring work of the CESCR impossible. 
30  See Protocol No 14 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention (2004) a 12, which 
amends a 35(3) of the Convention as follows: "The Court shall declare inadmissible any 
individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that : b) the applicant has not 
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A decision on the admissibility of a communication is to be made by a simple 
majority of the members of the CESCR or by a unanimous decision of a working 
group established by the CESCR under the Rules of Procedure.31 
Like the communication procedures under other treaty monitoring mechanisms, the 
Optional Protocol empowers the CESCR to issue interim measures to avoid possible 
irreparable damage to victims of socio-economic rights violations,32 to offer its good 
offices for the friendly settlement of disputes submitted to it,33 to consider inter-state 
communications through an opt-in clause,34 and to conduct an inquiry for grave or 
systematic violations of socio-economic rights by a State Party through an opt-in 
inquiry procedure.35 Further, in noting the importance of resources in the realisation 
of socio-economic rights, the Optional Protocol affirms the importance of 
international assistance and cooperation, giving the CESCR the mandate to request, 
with the consent of the specific State Party, technical assistance from relevant UN 
specialised agencies to the State Party.36 It also envisages the creation of a trust 
fund to enhance the realisation of socio-economic rights through the building of 
national capacities.37 
After receiving a communication, the CESCR is required to submit it to the relevant 
State Party, which is then expected to submit to the Committee within six months a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention 
and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided 
that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic 
tribunal." 
31  Provisional Rules Rule 8. 
32  OP-ICESCR a 5; Provisional Rules Rule 7. Also see Langford 2009a NJHR 24, who notes the 
importance of the interim measures in the protection of socio-economic rights from violations 
such as the "destruction of livelihoods, forced evictions, sudden retrogressive measures or lack 
of immediate reasonable action that could expose complaints to serious denial of their rights 
such as homelessness, destitution and exposure to disease". 
33  OP-ICESCR a 7; Provisional Rules Rule 15. 
34  OP-ICESCR a 10; Provisional Rules Rules 36-46. A State Party has to expressly declare that it 
recognises the competence of the CESCR to consider inter-state communications against it. It 
may choose to opt-out at any time, but this would not interfere with a communication already 
submitted. 
35  OP-ICESCR aa 11-12; Provisional Rules Rules 21-35. A State Party similarly has to expressly 
acknowledge the competence of the CESCR to conduct inquiries in its territory under the 
Optional Protocol. The inquiry procedure was deemed important as it would enable individuals 
and groups having difficulty in accessing the individual communications procedure or facing the 
danger of reprisals to have an alternative avenue for accessing a remedy for the violation of 
socio-economic rights. See Mahon 2008 HRL Rev 641. 
36  OP-ICESCR a 14. 
37  OP-ICESCR a 14(3). 
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response clarifying the complaint and indicating if any remedial action has been 
undertaken.38 When considering communications on their merits, which is to be 
done in closed meetings, the CESCR is required to examine in totality the submitted 
documentation as well as relevant documentation from UN bodies, specialised 
agencies and other international and regional organisations.39 After the 
consideration, the CESCR transmits its non-binding views and recommendations to 
the relevant State Party, which is required to respond to the Committee within six 
months, indicating the actions taken by the State in the light of the views and 
recommendations of the CESCR.40 The Committee is empowered by its Rules of 
Procedure to appoint a Special Rapporteur or establish a Working Group to conduct 
follow-up on the implementation of final recommendations of the Committee by the 
State Party.41 In undertaking the follow-up role, the Rapporteur or the Working 
Group is empowered to take all appropriate action to ensure that the views and 
recommendations of the CESCR are duly complied with.42 
One of the difficulties in enhancing the justiciability of socio-economic rights at the 
international level has been the challenge of designing workable criteria and 
standards of measurement for the judicial or quasi-judicial enforcement of these 
rights.43 In their argument opposing the adoption of the Optional Protocol, Dennis 
and Stewart44 contended that States would be reluctant to ratify an Optional 
                                                          
38  OP-ICESCR a 6; Provisional Rules Rule 10. 
39  OP-ICESCR a 8; Provisional Rules Rules 14, 19. See Chenwi 2009 AHRLJ 42, who argues that this 
provision permits the CESCR to consult international NGOs with expertise in the area of socio-
economic rights when determining an individual communication under the Optional Protocol. 
40  OP-ICESCR a 9. See Chenwi 2009 AHRLJ 46-47 for a discussion of the follow-up mechanism 
under the Optional Protocol. 
41  Provisional Rules Rule 18(5). 
42  Provisional Rules Rule 18(6)-(9). 
43  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 489-490. They argue at 496 that the task of assessing the 
violations of socio-economic rights is far more intricate than the task of assessing the violations 
of CPRs due to their interdependent and contextual nature and the fact that these rights present 
issues of considerably greater scope and complexity requiring more information as well as 
greater expertise to resolve. For an elaboration of the arguments for the insertion of assessment 
criteria into the text of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR during debates in the Working 
Group, see Porter 2009 NJHR 43-50. 
44  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 489. They further argue that even ratifying States may refuse to 
comply with decisions from a socio-economic rights adjudicatory body unless their decisions are 
based upon universally accepted principles. In this context, they contend as follows: "In order to 
be credible and have tangible impact, any criteria must be carefully tailored to set realistic and 
achievable goals. Such criteria cannot simply be decreed unilaterally by the adjudicators, but 
must be derived from a participatory process with input from the affected states." 
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Protocol for the international adjudication of socio-economic rights unless a clear 
standard was developed beforehand which indicated the criteria that will be used to 
determine whether and to what extent they have violated the provisions of the 
ICESCR. These concerns were noted by the CESCR in its statement on the OP-
ICESCR:45 
The Committee is aware of States parties' interest in obtaining further clarification 
as to how it would apply the obligation under article 2, paragraph 1, "to take steps 
… to the maximum of its available resources" to achieve progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. Of particular relevance is how 
the Committee would examine communications concerning this obligation, while 
fully respecting the authority vested in relevant State organs to adopt what it 
considers to be its most appropriate policies and to allocate resources accordingly. 
In responding to the concerns, the CESCR reiterated its elaboration of the nature of 
the obligations arising from the ICESCR in its General Comment Number 3, 
emphasising the need for State Parties to take concrete, deliberate and targeted 
steps through all appropriate means, including the enactment of legislation as well 
as the provision of judicial and other remedies, in order to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the Covenant rights.46 It further reiterated the immediate nature of the 
obligation to take steps, emphasising that the unavailability of resources on its own 
is an insufficient defence to the total failure to take steps aimed at the realisation of 
the Covenant rights, and that low-cost measures must be put in place to protect the 
most marginalised and vulnerable groups where resources are demonstrably 
inadequate.47 
In the exercise of its individual communications mandate under the Optional 
Protocol, the CESCR acknowledges that it is the responsibility of national State 
organs to formulate, adopt, fund and implement measures aimed at the realisation 
of socio-economic rights, and it has undertaken to give States the requisite margin 
of appreciation in their choice of measures aimed at the realisation of socio-
economic rights.48 It has, however, clarified that the extent of the margin of 
appreciation will depend a great deal on the transparency and the participative 
                                                          
45  CESCR 2007 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/e_c_12_2007_1.pdf (hereafter 
CESCR Statement) para 2. 
46  CESCR Statement para 3. 
47  CESCR Statement para 4. 
48  CESCR Statement para 11. 
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nature of the decision-making process in which the national measures are adopted 
and are being implemented.49 In determining if a State Party has failed to take steps 
to the maximum of its available resources to realise socio-economic rights, the 
CESCR will assess the adequacy or reasonableness of measures adopted by any 
particular State using the following criteria:50 
(a) the extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and targeted 
towards the fulfilment of socio-economic rights; 
(b) whether the State Party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-
arbitrary manner; 
(c) whether the State Party's decision (not) to allocate available resources was in 
accordance with international human rights standards; 
(d) where several policy options were available, whether the State Party adopted 
the option that least restricts Covenant rights; 
(e) the time frame in which the steps were taken; and 
(f)  whether the steps had taken into  account the  precarious situation of disadvan-
taged and marginalized individuals or groups; whether they were non-
discriminatory; and whether they prioritised grave situations or situations of risk. 
The CESCR further contended that should a State Party fail to take any measures or 
adopt retrogressive steps, the onus would be on the State to justify its action, taking 
into account the totality of the Covenant rights and the full use of its resources.51 
The CESCR acknowledges the disparities in resource availability in different contexts 
and between countries, and contends that in the event that a State uses "resource 
constraint" as a justification for the adoption of a retrogressive measure, it will 
assess such a claim using the following considerations:52 
(a) the country's level of development; 
(b) the severity of the alleged breach, in particular whether the situation concerned 
the enjoyment of the minimum core content of the Covenant; 
(c) the country's current economic situation, in particular whether the country was 
undergoing a period of economic recession; 
(d) the existence of other serious claims on the State Party's limited resources, for 
example, resulting from a recent natural disaster or from recent internal or 
international armed conflict; 
(e) the extent to which the State Party had sought to identify low-cost options; and 
(f) the extent to which the State Party had sought cooperation and assistance or 
rejected offers of resources from the international community for the purposes of 
implementing the provisions of the Covenant without sufficient reasons. 
                                                          
49  CESCR Statement para 11. 
50  CESCR Statement para 8. 
51  CESCR Statement para 9. 
52  CESCR Statement para 10. 
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The efforts to develop universal criteria for the assessment of individual 
communications is an indication that the CESCR is determined to be as objective as 
possible while taking into account the resource differentiations between States in the 
fulfilment of its mandate under the Optional Protocol. 
The elaboration of the above criteria was taken into account in the drafting of the 
Optional Protocol, leading to the insertion of article 8(4), which provides as follows:53 
When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall 
consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance 
with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the 
State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation 
of the rights set forth in the Covenant. 
In their analysis of this provision of the Optional Protocol, Vandenbogaerde and 
Vandenhole54 have argued that this assessment criterion is unprecedented and is 
unique to the Optional Protocol. They contend that it was inserted by States due to a 
fundamental mistrust of some States in the judgment of the CESCR as well as the 
ideological concerns of these States as to the justiciability of socio-economic rights.55 
Griffey56 has added to these reasons for the elaboration of article 8(4) by contending 
that the need for its inclusion arose from State concerns over the extent to which 
their policymaking and budgetary choices would come under the Committee's 
magnifying glass, and whether the Committee would recommend costly measures to 
remedy the harm caused to claimants by breaches of the Covenant. Acknowledging 
the importance of article 8(4) to the overall effectiveness of the individual 
communications regime under the Optional Protocol, Porter57 has argued as follows: 
Whether the vision of a truly unified approach to human rights that is fully inclusive 
of claimants affirming the right to freedom from want, is actually realised through 
the Optional Protocol will largely depend on how its Article 8(4) is interpreted and 
applied. This will, in turn, inform and be informed by the way in which the principle 
of reasonableness review of substantive social rights claims evolves at other treaty 
monitoring bodies, in regional systems and in domestic law. 
                                                          
53  For an analysis of the drafting history of a 8(4), see Griffey 2011 HRL Rev 291-304. 
54  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 223-226. 
55  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 223-226. Also see Griffey 2011 HRL Rev 277. 
56  Griffey 2011 HRL Rev 279, 292-294. 
57  Porter 2009 NJHR 40. 
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Porter58 calls article 8(4) "a double-edged sword", which can either be used 
restrictively to accord unlimited margin of appreciation to States' socio-economic 
policies to the detriment of adequate adjudication and the provision of effective 
remedies for substantive socio-economic rights claims, or progressively, as a 
mechanism aimed at responding effectively to the challenges of genuine socio-
economic rights claims that go to the root of the systemic causes of poverty and 
exclusion. Porter59 concludes that if the article is interpreted in the light of its 
drafting history and the challenges the Optional Protocol was intended to respond 
to, it is capable of facilitating the achievement of the adequate adjudication and 
effective remedies for violations of the Covenant. Despite the obvious importance of 
article 8(4) in individual communications under the Optional Protocol, Griffey60 
reminds us that it does not change the substantive normative socio-economic rights 
obligations in the ICESCR, and must be interpreted and applied consistently and in 
conformity with the Covenant. 
3 Importance of the individual communications mechanism under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
The realisation of socio-economic rights has always been subject to the standard of 
"progressive realisation" as entrenched in article 2(1) of the ICESCR. This necessarily 
meant that the enactment of legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks was 
an important component of their fulfilment. Due to the prominent role national 
institutions play in elaborating and enacting these frameworks, many States 
contended that the elaboration of an Optional Protocol envisaging an international 
complaint mechanism would dictate to States the kind of policies to adopt, or even 
the type of macro-economic system to adopt.61 
The drafters of the Optional Protocol responded to these concerns by adopting the 
reasonableness approach as the standard of assessment of the States' socio-
economic rights implementation framework in article 8(4) of the Protocol, as well as 
                                                          
58  Porter 2009 NJHR 40. 
59  Porter 2009 NJHR 40. 
60  Griffey 2011 HRL Rev 322. 
61  Langford 2009 NJHR 25-26. 
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acknowledging the wide range of options available to States in their realisation of 
these rights.62 This provision is in line with the purpose of the Optional Protocol, not 
as a forward-looking mechanism to act as a catalyst for social change by 
determining the policies to be put in place by States for the realisation of socio-
economic rights, but as a backward-gazing (ex post) monitoring mechanism which 
"focuses on providing accountability and remedies in those cases of alleged 
violations that are submitted to the Committee".63 The Optional Protocol thus 
envisages States having the requisite discretion to choose the policies for the 
realisation of socio-economic rights that are best suited to their situation, with the 
CESCR assessing only the adequacy and reasonableness of the measures adopted by 
a State when a complaint for the violation of a particular right is brought against the 
specific State. This thus ensures that States retain their sovereignty as to the choice 
of legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks for the realisation of socio-
economic rights, as well as other national macro-economic policies. 
One of the most enduring challenges to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights is their lack of precise, clear and enforceable content.64 This challenge has 
been emphasised in comparison to civil and political rights, which are said to have a 
clear and judicially enforceable content.65 However, it is not always acknowledged 
that the extensive jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee in relation to its 
individual communications mandate under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR has 
had a lot to do with the clarity and stable content of these rights.66 That a similar 
mechanism has been lacking at the international level in relation to socio-economic 
rights has had much to do with the nebulous content of these rights.67 It is 
anticipated that this will change as a result of the adoption of the Optional Protocol 
                                                          
62  Langford 2009 NJHR 25-26. 
63  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 231-232. 
64  This was one of the grounds under which Sweden expressed its doubts with regard to the 
elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which it expressed as follows/; "... for an 
individual complaints procedure to function in a credible and efficient way, the State obligations 
to which such a procedure would refer would have to be precise". See De Albuquerque 2010 
Hum Rts Q 152, note 37. 
65  See Arambulo 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L & Pol'y 114-120. 
66  De Albuquerque 2010 Hum Rts Q 148-149. 
67  De Albuquerque 2010 Hum Rts Q 148-149. Also see Langa 2009 NJHR 33-34, who remarks as 
follows: "I agree with the view that the content of these rights is less clearly defined more 
because of their exclusion from the realm of adjudication, than due to an inherent vagueness." 
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to the ICESCR.68 This latitude is acknowledged by Kratochvil,69 who argues as 
follows: 
To find all obligations generated by a right and to clarify any ambiguities, 
practitioners must look to the case law and not simply the text of an article. Even if 
the rights in the Covenant look imprecise, it does not hinder their adjudication any 
more than civil rights. After all, interpreting and making obligations concrete by 
relating them to real life situations and questions is the essence of judicial work. 
In dealing with individual communications for the violation of socio-economic rights, 
the CESCR will enhance the practical elaboration of the content of the rights 
entrenched in the Covenant in specific contextual situations. It will also enhance the 
clarification and elucidation of the specific obligations arising from Covenant rights, 
with the result that these rights are better protected, promoted, implemented and 
fulfilled.70 
Under its State reporting function, the CESCR had adopted an expansive and broad 
elaboration of the rights in the ICESCR through its Concluding Observations. It has 
similarly taken a broad approach in the elaboration of its numerous General 
Comments, based on its experience of considering State reports.71 This broad 
elaboration had been due to the fact that State reporting is a dialogical exercise 
which does not generally entail the finding of violation of rights by State Parties. This 
broad elaboration of socio-economic rights by the CESCR has been one of the 
criticisms against the adoption of the OP-ICESCR, in general, and the mandating of 
the CESCR to determine individual communications via the Optional Protocol, in 
                                                          
68  For an extensive discussion of this contention, see Scheinin and Langford 2009 NJHR 99ff, where 
they argue that the previous situation of a lack of an international institutional mechanism for 
the adjudication of socio-economic rights had starved the rights of the requisite oxygen for their 
development, stating that justiciability does not depend on the nature of the norm concerned, 
but rather on the authority of the body making the decision. 
69  Kratochvil 2009 Hum Rts Br 31, 33. 
70  See International NGO Coalition for OP-ICESCR 2013 http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/1475393 2. 
See also Arambulo 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L & Pol'y 116, who argues that the clear nature of civil 
and political rights is because they were based on existing national jurisprudence, a fact not true 
for socio-economic rights, and also that even after their elaboration in the ICCPR, the civil and 
political rights have been subjected to more judicial interpretation, with the result that their 
norms are clearer, more precise and better understood. Juridical elaboration of the content of 
socio-economic rights will thus similarly enhance the clarity and precision of the content of their 
norms. 
71  See Scheinin and Langford 2009 NJHR 100, where they note the concern of opponents of an 
Optional Protocol that the CESCR has either been too far-reaching in some of its General 
Comments or has been insufficiently precise in some of its Concluding Observations. 
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particular.72 However, with the adoption of the Optional Protocol giving it the 
ensuing mandate to consider individual communications, the CESCR will have to 
adjust this expansive approach and adopt a more juridical approach to treaty 
interpretation so as to strengthen the foreseeability and consistency of its 
jurisprudence.73 The CESCR will thus, more likely, be relatively conservative in its 
consideration of individual communications under the Optional Protocol than it was 
in its interpretation of rights under the more dialogic State reporting mandate. 
States are differently situated in terms of their prevailing social conditions as well as 
the availability of structural, human and financial resources for the realisation of 
socio-economic rights. This was the reason why the "progressive realisation" 
standard was adopted in the ICESCR and why there was opposition to the adoption 
of the OP-ICESCR. In assigning both the mandate to consider State reports under 
the Covenant and the individual communications procedure under the OP-ICESCR to 
the CESCR, the expertise as well as the ability of the CESCR to acknowledge and 
take into account the contextual situation of each State in the exercise of its 
communications mandate is enhanced by its holistic delving into a State's situation in 
the exercise of its treaty-reporting mandate.74 In this way, a holistic and 
interdependent interpretation of the provisions of the ICESCR, taking into account 
the distinctive contextual situations of State Parties, is ensured.75 The importance of 
context-sensitive adjudication is acknowledged by the former Chief Justice of South 
Africa, the late Justice Langa,76 in the following words: 
Through this mechanism, the Committee receiving the complaints will receive 
information on the nature of the complaint and ultimately gain insight into the 
challenges faced by the complainant and the extent of the limitations or 
perpetrations committed by the Member State. This would enable the Committee to 
develop a jurisprudence that is sensitive to the global realities, which could provide 
                                                          
72  See Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 490-498. They contend that the CESCR's broad maximalist 
approach has the potential to extend the international liability of State Parties beyond the 
Covenant provisions, at 493. 
73  Scheinin 2006 HRL Rev 133. 
74  Scheinin 2006 HRL Rev 133. This aspect is especially augmented by the practice of the CESCR to 
receive additional information on a State's situation through alternative reports by NGOs in the 
exercise of its treaty reporting mandate, a practice that enables the CESCR to have a more 
complete and accurate picture of any given State's contextual human rights situation. See 
Arambulo 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L & Pol'y 126-127. 
75  Scheinin 2006 HRL Rev 133. 
76  Langa 2009 NJHR 31. 
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a useful framework through which further complaints, concerning other member 
States, may be analysed and understood. 
Respect for context and the mandate of national political institutions to choose, 
adopt, develop, implement and enforce measures for the realisation of socio-
economic rights is further entrenched in the Optional Protocol itself in article 8(4), 
which encompasses the reasonableness standard.77  
4 The possible challenges to the effectiveness of the individual 
communications mechanism under the Optional Protocol 
As a mechanism for human rights enforcement under the UN system, the Optional 
Protocol similarly suffers from challenges affecting most such mechanisms. Some of 
these challenges result from political and ideological compromises made during 
drafting; some arise from the composition and role of the CESCR; and others from 
limited capacity and resources. These challenges are discussed below. 
4.1  Challenges due to political and ideological compromises 
One of the major challenges to the effectiveness of the individual communications 
mechanism under the Optional Protocol results from the fact that it is the outcome 
of a compromise fraught with political and ideological struggles, leading to the 
adoption of an instrument with weaker wording and weaker procedural protection.78 
The challenges resulting from compromise in the international elaboration of legal 
instruments with a global reach are described by Antonio Cassese79 as follows: 
[UN complaint mechanisms] tend to be so conditioned, in their unfolding, by 
political and diplomatic considerations, that often their final result is rather weak, 
being couched in terms that are too general or too diplomatic. 
This was the situation with the Optional Protocol, leading to the watering down of 
certain provisions such as the failure to include a provision for collective complaints; 
the deletion of the requirement that local remedies must be effective if they are to 
be considered as remedies worthy of exhaustion; the requirement that 
communications be submitted within a year after the exhaustion of local remedies; 
                                                          
77  For an elaboration of the reasonableness approach adopted under a 8(4), see s 2 above. 
78  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 231. 
79  Cassese International Criminal Law 389. 
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the inclusion of the inter-state and the inquiry procedures as opt-in provisions; as 
well as the unprecedented inclusion of "assessment criteria" under article 8(4).80 
With a relatively weak procedure, the concerns are that the complaint mechanism 
will not be able to meaningfully consider violations of socio-economic rights and 
enhance their overall protection, which was the very reason for the elaboration of 
the Optional Protocol.81 
In their critique of the OP-ICESCR, Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole82 flag some of 
the issues that were either provided for inadequately in the Protocol or were left out 
entirely, and which would have made the individual complaints mechanism more 
effective in the protection of socio-economic rights. The first issue they raise is the 
failure to clarify the legal nature of the obligation of international cooperation and 
assistance in the realisation of these rights. In this context, they argue that this lack 
of clarity led to the subsequent failure to provide effectively for the shared 
responsibility and solidarity of States for the realisation of socio-economic rights and 
the concomitant extraterritorial obligations of States, an important tool in addressing 
socio-economic rights violations in a globalising world.83 The second issue that is 
likely to detract from the effectiveness of the Optional Protocol is the entrenchment 
of the enquiry procedure and the inter-state complaint procedures only as opt-in 
procedures, curtailing the full potential of these two procedures as avenues for the 
protection of Covenant rights.84 The third issue likely to detract from the 
effectiveness of the Optional Protocol is the failure to include a collective complaint 
procedure without a victim requirement, a challenge that is likely to curtail the 
important role that NGOs and other such institutions can play in filing 
communications entailing a more general or systematic violation of socio-economic 
rights affecting a large group of people or entire communities.85 The fourth issue 
                                                          
80  For an elaboration of the reasonableness approach adopted under a 8(4), see s 2 above. 
81  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 231. 
82  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 232. 
83  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 232. 
84  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 233-236. 
85  Despite the importance of the collective complaint procedure, it is important to note that the 
Elements Paper by the Chairperson of the Working Group drafting the OP-ICESCR indicated that 
none of the UN human rights mechanisms foresees a collective communications procedure. See 
De Albuquerque 2006 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/164/64/PDF/ 
G0516464.pdf para 10(c). 
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flagged by the authors is the deletion of an exception to the rule regarding the 
exhaustion of local remedies which required only effective national remedies to be 
exhausted, an exception that is contained in other UN legal instruments.86 The 
retention of the exception would have compelled States to provide effective 
domestic remedies for the violation of SERs in their domestic jurisdictions, with 
failure on the part of the State to provide such remedies leading to the direct filing 
of individual complaints to the CESCR against it under the Optional Protocol.87 The 
fifth challenge to the effectiveness of the Optional Protocol is the inclusion of the 
provision allowing the CESCR to decline a communication that does not demonstrate 
that a clear disadvantage was suffered, a provision which was aimed at curtailing a 
floodgate of communications to the CESCR, and which might limit, at the 
admissibility stage, cases worthy of consideration on their merits.88 The last 
challenge is the deletion of the provision prohibiting reservations, which technically 
allows States to opt out of some provisions of the Protocol, to the detriment of its 
overall effectiveness.89 
Despite the above challenge, the effectiveness of the individual communication 
mechanism will depend on the tenacity of the CESCR in breathing life into the 
provisions of the Optional Protocol through pragmatic yet progressive interpretation, 
with the aim of enhancing the elaboration and protection of socio-economic rights. 
For example, in relation to the deletion of the provision requiring domestic remedies 
to be effective, it has been suggested that these concern can be addressed by the 
CESCR adopting the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, which has 
affirmed, in the case of Patino v Panama,90 that only remedies that are reasonably 
effective and which offer a claimant reasonable prospects of redress need to be 
exhausted.91 
                                                          
86  These include: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1984); the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990); the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1999) (OP-CEDAW); and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (OP-CRPD). 
87  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 234. 
88  Langford 2009 NJHR 23-24; Scheinin and Langford 2009 NJHR 110-111. 
89  Vandenbogaerde and Vandenhole 2010 HRL Rev 235-236. 
90  Patino v Panama Communication No 437/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/437/1990 (1994). 
91  Langford 2009 NJHR 22-23. 
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4.2  Legitimacy and the capacity of the CESCR to consider individual 
communications 
Concerns have been raised about the legitimacy of the CESCR, a creation of the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a body with a limited membership if 
compared to the General Assembly of the UN, to consider individual communications 
on the violations of socio-economic rights.92 Similarly, it has been argued that the 
CESCR, as presently constituted, will be unable to handle the high number of 
individual communications expected to be filed when the Optional Protocol comes 
into force and still fulfil its monitoring obligations of State reporting under the 
ICESCR.93 In this context, Dennis and Stewart94 argue as follows: 
It is simply unrealistic to expect that any single body of experts could, in a timely 
manner, handle a flood of individual cases from a broad range of states across the 
globe, covering the full panoply of Covenant rights. 
They further contend:95 
Extrapolating from the available information, what could one anticipate if the 
[CESCR] were charged with resolving complaints about violations under the 
Covenant? By its own calculations the Committee is now able to review 
implementation reports from only some 10 states per year. With 149 states parties, 
that means a review cycle of roughly fifteen years. Adding even a relatively light 
caseload to this burden could more than double that period and possibly also 
degrade the Committee's work in other respects. 
Concerns about the legitimacy of the CESCR considering individual communications 
under the Optional Protocol simply because it was created by ECOSOC and not 
directly under the ICESCR are overstated. Despite being created by ECOSOC, the 
CESCR has been largely successful in monitoring compliance with the ICESCR 
through State reporting and has gained the respect of States. A significant number 
of State parties have complied with its Concluding Observations and taken into 
account its interpretation of Covenant rights through its General Comments.96 It is 
difficult to see this respect and compliance changing just because the CESCR's new 
                                                          
92  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 506-507. 
93  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 507-509. 
94  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 507. 
95  Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 509. 
96  For a comprehensive analysis of the work of the CESCR and the influence it has had in the 
realisation of socio-economic rights at the national and international level, see generally 
Sepulveda Nature of Obligations; Craven ICESCR. 
F VILJOEN AND N ORAGO   PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2573 
mandate under the Optional Protocol envisages the Committee making non-binding 
recommendations on State Parties' violations of socio-economic rights.97 
The challenge as to capacity, in terms of the time available for the CESCR to 
undertake its duties, as well as its professional capacity to undertake its diverse 
duties, is genuine and needs to be looked into more carefully. Justice Langa98 
acknowledged the need for adequate capacity to handle all the challenges that the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights entails, and advised that for the CESCR to be 
able to undertake its role effectively, it would be crucial to have members with the 
requisite skills, qualifications and capacity to employ creative solutions to ensure 
compliance with the Committee's findings. These concerns were also acknowledged 
during the drafting process of the Optional Protocol, and the Chairperson in her 
elements paper considered the need to enhance the capacity of the CESCR through 
the hiring of professional staff to assist the Committee in its individual 
communications mandate.99 The CESCR also acknowledged these challenges with 
regard to its capacity to handle the complexity of ESCR adjudication at the 
international level, and it responded to these challenges by detailing in its provisional 
rules of procedure the possibility of establishing Working Groups or designating 
Rapporteurs to make recommendations to the Committee or to assist the Committee 
in a specified way in its individual communications mandate.100 Though a genuine 
challenge, the issue of capacity can be effectively bridged through the hiring of 
professional staff to assist the CESCR with its work, as well as by the CESCR 
engaging professional bodies in its individual complaints mandate. 
                                                          
97  See Human Rights Law Resource Centre 2009 http://www.hrlrc.org.au/files/op-icescr-hrlrc-
submission-to-government.pdf para 31-34, where they affirm that even though views and 
recommendations from the CESCR will be non-binding legally, States have a duty to take steps 
to implement them in good faith in cooperation with the CESCR and treat the views as 
"authoritative determination by the organ established under the Covenant itself" (footnote 
omitted). 
98  Langa 2009 NJHR 36. 
99  De Albuquerque 2006 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/164/64/PDF/ 
G0516464.pdf paras 57-59. 
100  Provisional Rules Rule 6.  
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4.3  Resource constraints 
Concerns about the availability of resources within the UN are closely linked to the 
capacity concerns raised above.101 During the negotiations and the drafting process 
in the Working Group, concerns were raised as to the viability of the creation of a 
new complaints mechanism within the UN system, taking into account the reality of 
the dwindling resources available to the UN treaty monitoring mechanisms.102 It was 
observed that due to these constraints, the creation of the complaints mechanism 
would severely eat into the resources of the CESCR, with the result that the quality 
of its work on treaty monitoring and the consideration of State reports would 
decline.103 These are genuine concerns, but the dire situation being faced by people 
whose socio-economic rights are violated extensively all over the world with adverse 
consequences cannot be overlooked simply due to disquiets about costs. To respond 
to these capacity and resource constraint challenges, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has undertaken a process of 
harmonisation of the work of the different UN treaty body mechanisms to enhance 
the efficient use of resources and to increase the support of the Secretariat to the 
different mechanisms.104 The streamlining of administrative and support services 
being offered to the different international complaint mechanisms by the OHCHR will 
ensure that the available resources are used effectively to improve the operations of 
the complaint mechanisms for the benefit of victims of socio-economic rights 
violations. 
5 Argument for Accession to the Optional Protocol by South Africa 
The argument for accession by South Africa to the OP-ICESCR departs from the 
premise that South Africa has become (or at least will very soon be) a State Party to 
the ICESCR.105 Having signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994, South Africa has taken 
                                                          
101  For a comprehensive elaboration of the resource constraints facing the UN Human Rights Treaty 
bodies, see Pillay 2012 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/HCReport 
TBStrengthening.pdf 25-28. 
102  Langford 2009 NJHR 17. 
103  Langford 2009 NJHR 17. Also see Dennis and Stewart 2004 AJIL 510-511. 
104  Pillay 2012 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/HCReportTBStrengthening.pdf 
32ff. 
105  As South Africa has already signed the ICESCR, the term "ratification" is used to denote the 
formal acceptance of the treaty as binding on the country; and given that South Africa - as a 
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some significant steps towards its ratification. In particular, on 10 October 2012 
Cabinet approved ratification of the Covenant.106 The process has subsequently 
moved to Parliament in accordance with section 231(2) of the South African 
Constitution, which provides that an international agreement must be approved by 
both Houses of Parliament, namely the National Assembly and the National Council 
of Provinces, by way of a resolution of ratification, before approval becomes legally 
binding upon the Republic. Although this process has been stalled significantly, it is 
still on-going and it is hoped that South Africa will soon ratify the ICESCR.107 
Having enacted a Constitution which entrenches a very extensive corpus of human 
rights, including justiciable socio-economic rights, and having made progressive 
steps towards ratifying the ICESCR, the substantive international human rights 
instrument providing for these rights, the question for South Africa in relation to the 
accession of the OP-ICESCR is not so much one of enlarging the scope of human 
rights standards, but one of adding to the enforcement of the already accepted 
standards.108 Ratification of the ICESCR is important as it will ensure substantive 
uniformity in the normative standards for the realisation of socio-economic rights at 
the national and international level and cure the supposed difference in the structure 
of socio-economic rights as provided in the 1996 Constitution and the ICESCR.109 
Further, as the ratification process should in principle be preceded by a renewed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
non-state party to the Covenant - has not been in a position to sign the OP-ICESCR, the 
argument is that South Africa should accede to the Optional Protocol either simultaneously with 
ratifying the Covenant, or as soon as is feasible thereafter. Initial signature, followed by 
ratification of the OP-ICESCR will in our view be an unnecessary waste of time. 
106  See Government Communications 2012 http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-
releases/cabstatements/11Ict2012 where it was decided as follows: "Cabinet approved that 
South Africa accede to the United Nations International Covenant on Economic and Cultural 
Rights. The recommendation will be tabled in Parliament for ratification in line with Section 
231(2) of the South African Constitution. The Covenant is a key international treaty which seeks 
to encourage State Parties to address challenges of inequality, unemployment and poverty, 
which are critical to the strategic goals of governments." 
107  International organisations and civil society groups have decried the slow process of accession to 
the ICESCR by South Africa. For an analysis of these concerns, see ICESCR Ratification 
Campaign date unknown http://www.peopletoparliament.org.za/focus-areas/socio-economic-
rights/ 
campaigns/Statements-20on-20ratification-20of-20ICESCR-20by-20SA-20-2031.08.2010-1.PDF. 
108  See Evju 2009 NJHR 85, making a similar point in relation to Norway. 
109  For a comparative analysis of the provisions of the 1996 Constitution vis-à-vis the provisions of 
the ICESCR, see ICESCR Ratification Campaign date unknown http://www.peopleto 
parliament.org.za/focus-areas/socio-economic-rights/campaigns/Comparison-20Chart-20-20the-
20ICESCR.the-20Constitution.and-20the-20African-20Charter-1.PDF. 
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compatibility study, which would ensure that not only the Constitution but all other 
domestic laws and policies correspond to the international obligations entrenched in 
the ICESCR, South Africa's ratification of the Covenant is thus likely to ensure 
constitutional, legislative and policy conformity with South Africa's international 
socio-economic rights obligations. The result of the acceptance of both the Covenant 
and its Optional Protocol would be that socio-economic rights would be better 
observed, respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled by all levels and organs of the 
State.110 Therefore, once South Africa's ratification of the ICESCR has been 
formalised, the added accession of the Optional Protocol would only be a 
complementary procedural tool for the enforcement of ICESCR rights.111 
Given that South Africa already has in place a comprehensive constitutional 
framework and institutional mechanisms for the vindication of socio-economic rights, 
what is the added value for South Africa in acceding to the OP-ICESCR? In the view 
of the authors, accession would be of benefit to South Africa as a State, to South 
Africans in general, and to the international community at large. These beneficial 
interests largely dovetail with the major reason for the elaboration of an OP-ICESCR, 
which is to enhance the realisation of socio-economic rights at the national and 
international level. During the debates in the Working Group sessions, the following 
potential benefits of the Optional Protocol to future state parties, in general, were 
noted:112 
A complaints mechanism would: encourage States parties to ensure more effective 
local remedies; promote the development of international jurisprudence, which 
would in turn promote the development of domestic jurisprudence on economic, 
social and cultural rights; strengthen international accountability; enable the 
adjudicating body to study concrete cases and thus enable it to create a more 
concise jurisprudence. 
Below, these benefits are elaborated on and placed in a specifically South African 
context. 
                                                          
110  CHR and SAIFAC "Memorandum to the Department of Justice" paras 3, 5. 
111  Griffey 2011 HRL Rev 318. 
112  OHCHR 2004 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/120/29/PDF/G0412029. 
pdf?OpenElement para 23. 
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5.1  Acceding to the OP-ICESCR will provide an additional safety net in 
instances of failure of recourse at the domestic level 
By giving concrete form to the principle of the indivisibility of rights in its Bill of 
Rights, and by providing examples of the viability of the judicial adjudication of 
socio-economic rights, South Africa's 1996 Constitution has become a beacon to 
other states across the globe. The entrenchment of socio-economic rights in the 
1996 South African Constitution has been held out as one of the most transformative 
aspects of the Constitution, and these rights have been hailed as instruments to 
build a caring society based on human dignity and equality. The transformative 
potential of justiciable socio-economic rights was affirmed in the Grootboom 
judgment, where the Constitutional Court held as follows:113 
All the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutually supporting. There 
can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values 
of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter. Affording 
socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights 
enshrined in Chapter 2. The realisation of these rights is also key to the 
advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution of a society in which 
men and women are equally able to achieve their full potential. 
The jurisprudence of the South African courts indicates that the constitutionally 
entrenched justiciable socio-economic rights are important for the eradication of 
poverty, inequality and marginalisation, as well as for the overall constitutional 
project of enhancing substantive equality, human dignity, social justice and the 
holistic transformation of the South African society into a more egalitarian and caring 
society. With the aim of achieving this constitutional project, South Africa has put in 
place an extensive range of mechanisms for the protection and promotion of socio-
economic rights at the national level, including the judiciary, the South African 
Human Rights Commission, and the Commission on Gender Equality. 
                                                          
113  See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 23. The 
Court further noted in para 44 as follows: "A society must seek to ensure that the basic 
necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and 
equality. To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the 
denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those, whose needs are the most urgent, and 
whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures 
aimed at achieving realisation of the right." 
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Despite this wide array of protection mechanisms, there may be instances where 
these mechanisms fail to adequately or effectively protect the socio-economic rights 
of South Africans, with severe implications for equality, human dignity and freedom, 
values that underpin the national constitutional project. If this occurs, access to an 
international mechanism provides an essential procedure by which individuals can 
access a remedy to repair a contravention. Such a mechanism at the international 
level is provided for by both the individual communication mechanism established 
under the OP-ICESCR and the opt-in inquiry procedure under the Protocol. 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg provides an example of a case where the individual 
complaint mechanism may have been relevant. In this case, the Constitutional Court 
overruled both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal with regard to the 
content of the right to adequate water (the sufficiency of the free basic water that 
was being provided by the City) and the legality of pre-paid water metres in the 
poorer parts of the City of Johannesburg.114 The availability of the international 
mechanism would have enabled the litigants to access an alternative forum for the 
amelioration of their dire health and sanitary situation, taking into account the 
normative purposes and values underpinning socio-economic rights as contained in 
the ICESCR and the jurisprudence of the CESCR in relation to the right to water as 
contained in General Comment Number 15.115 
It is crucial that international complaints mechanisms, as provided for under the OP-
ICESCR, are available to right-holders as they provide a complementary avenue for 
rights claimants to access justice, thereby enhancing the overall realisation of socio-
economic rights.116 This is acknowledged by Simmons,117 who argues that "these 
complaints can complement and support broader domestic social movements to prod 
governments to change public policies and priorities". The availability of this 
complementary international mechanism, even if it results in findings that are not 
formally binding, enhances the weight of advocacy in the domestic political 
processes, with the result that the needs of the vulnerable and marginalised groups 
                                                          
114  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC). 
115  CESCR General Comment No 15: The Right to Water (2003). 
116  Simmons 2009 NJHR 65-66. 
117  Simmons 2009 NJHR 72. 
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are brought to bear in national policy decision-making for the realisation of socio-
economic rights. The importance of these international quasi-judicial mechanisms in 
the domestic protection of rights is further affirmed by Roach118 who, in discussing 
the importance of the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, states as follows: 
Complaints under the Optional Protocol operate in an asymmetrical fashion; they 
guard against under-enforcement as opposed to over-enforcement of rights at the 
domestic level and thus serve as a potential buffer against the sense of 
complacency that can occur when domestic courts find that no rights have been 
violated. 
Therefore, by acceding to the OP-ICESCR, South Africa will enhance the protection 
of these rights through the provision of further complementary safeguards against 
their violation, thus enhancing the potential that the social transformation envisaged 
by the 1996 Constitution is actually achieved for the majority of South Africans.119 
Accession will signal South Africa's humility in accepting that that there may be 
cracks, however small, in its protective framework. By proclaiming its commitment to 
the justiciability of these rights as an international commitment it further solidifies 
this position and makes its future reversal all the more improbable. Accession will 
also signal its continued commitment to the eradication of poverty, inequality and 
marginalisation through all the available legal means, domestically and 
internationally.120 
5.2  Acceding to the OP-ICESCR will affirm South Africa's place as an 
international leader in the protection of justiciable socio-economic 
rights 
Having entrenched and adjudicated on a wide range of socio-economic rights at the 
national level, South Africa continues to be a trend-setter for the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights internationally. The national jurisprudence 
emanating from the South African Courts, especially the South African Constitutional 
                                                          
118  Roach 2004-2005 Tex Int'l LJ 540. Roach argues further at 354-355 that international quasi-
judicial mechanisms serve as an antidote to a danger observed by James Bradley Thayer that 
democracies which rely on the judicial enforcement of bills of rights may become complacent 
about rights. 
119  Chenwi and Hardowar 2010 ESR Review 5. 
120  CHR and SAIFAC "Memorandum to the Department of Justice" para 2. 
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Court's decisions in the cases of Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign121 and 
Soobramoney,122 have been the guiding lights in the debate on and the drafting of 
the OP-ICESCR.123 This was reflected in the specific adoption in the OP-ICESCR of 
the reasonableness approach - as developed in the Grootboom judgment - as a 
prominent component of the assessment criteria in the adjudication of cases under 
the Optional Protocol.124 This is affirmed by Porter who contends as follows:125 
The incorporation of wording from the Grootboom judgment suggests, as does the 
drafting history, that just as the South African Constitutional Court has incorporated 
jurisprudence from the CESCR into its own domestic jurisprudence, so has South 
African jurisprudence now informed the text of an international human rights 
instrument. There are a number of aspects of the reasonableness standard affirmed 
in the Grootboom decision which should, in turn, inform the interpretation and 
application of Article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol. 
By acceding to the Optional Protocol, South Africa will continue being the beacon for 
other States in emphasising the justiciability of socio-economic rights both at the 
national and international level, with the result that these rights are better protected 
in domestic jurisdictions around the world and in the international sphere.126 
Together with the requirement of international solidarity in the realisation of socio-
economic rights in all parts of the world, these should encourage South Africa to 
accede to the Optional Protocol. This is especially so in the light of South Africa's 
effort to maintain a high profile internationally as a State which is human rights 
compliant and which has taken serious strides to enhance domestic adjudication of 
socio-economic rights.127 Failure to become a party to the Optional Protocol would 
contradict this key aspect of South Africa's foreign and international development 
                                                          
121  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 1) 2002 5 SA 703 (CC). 
122  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
123  De Albuquerque 2006 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/164/64/PDF/ 
G0516464.pdf paras 38-41, 62; Chenwi and Hardowar 2010 ESR Review 5. 
124  Langa 2009 NJHR 32-33; Porter 2009 NJHR 46, 49-51. 
125  Porter 2009 NJHR 50-51. 
126  See for example Human Rights Law Resource Centre 2009 http://www.hrlrc.org.au/files/op-
icescr-hrlrc-submission-to-government.pdf para 69, who, in arguing for the ratification of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR by Australia, points to the jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court to indicate that socio-economic rights are sufficiently precise and capable of 
interpretation by the CESCR in the application of its individual communications mandate. 
127  See SPII 2013 http://www.spii.org.za/agentfiles/434/file/ICESCR%20Booklet%20%28Jan2013% 
29.pdf 3, where they quote the founding President of the Post-Apartheid South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela, who pledged that "human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs". 
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policies, and might be used as a precedent to undermine efforts to promote and 
protect socio-economic rights elsewhere. 
Further, accession by South Africa, a country with evident experience in the 
domestic protection of socio-economic rights, would also encourage the ratification 
and accession of the Optional Protocol by other African States, as the history of 
ratification of similar treaties indicates that States have a tendency to emulate the 
ratification practices of other States in their regions, especially regional hegemons, 
due to either moral or political pressure.128 By mid-2014 only one African State, 
Gabon, had ratified the OP-ICESCR.129 Should South Africa accede to the OP-ICESCR 
more African States might be encouraged to ratify or accede to it, resulting in the 
realisation of the dream of the drafters of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights as contained in the preamble paragraph 8 of the Charter, which 
provides as follows: 
[It is] essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that 
civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural 
rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of 
economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights. 
Widespread ratification of the Optional Protocol in Africa would enhance the respect, 
protection, promotion and enforcement of socio-economic rights in Africa, and thus 
improve the dire human development situation evidenced by the pervasive poverty 
and the lack of access to basic goods and services. 
5.3  Acceding to the OP-ICESCR will encourage the development of 
uniform assessment standards internationally for the realisation of 
socio-economic rights and thus ensure greater consistency 
Different national and regional courts have adopted different approaches and 
strategies in the judicial adjudication of socio-economic rights. An international 
                                                          
128  Simmons 2009 NJHR 64, 77-80. She contends at 65 that "[t]hose governments who already take 
these rights seriously should ratify as a model to encourage others to follow suit". 
129  So far only 14 countries have ratified the OP-ICESCR and they are Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, El-Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Mongolia, Montenegro, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain and Uruguay - see UN Treaty Collection 2014 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en. 
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mechanism for the adjudication of socio-economic rights has the potential to 
comprehensively combine these different approaches to build a progressive 
international jurisprudence aimed at enhancing the full realisation of these rights 
globally.130 This international jurisprudence will not only enhance the development of 
the content of socio-economic rights, but will also help ascertain the specific 
contours of States' international socio-economic rights obligations, leading to legal 
certainty and its attendant improvement in the implementation of and compliance 
with these rights.131 Simmons132 emphasises this by stating as follows: 
Allowing individuals to lodge complaints can be an important part of the process of 
gradually coming to a clearer understanding about what social and economic rights 
entail and what constitutes a good faith effort on the part of States Parties to 
comply with their international legal obligations. 
In the application of this international jurisprudence on socio-economic rights at the 
national level, it is also important to note that the views resulting from the individual 
communications mandate of CESCR under the Optional Protocol are non-binding, 
which means that the domestic courts will still retain the power to scrutinise and 
censure the jurisprudence from the CESCR when considering its potential influence 
on domestic democratic decision-making, with the result that judicial power is not 
irrevocably transferred to the international level.133 As the leader in domestic socio-
economic rights adjudication, South Africa could thus benefit greatly from this 
international comparative jurisprudence in its own national adjudication of socio-
economic rights, with the result that these rights would be better protected 
nationally and victims of their violation would be afforded adequate and effective 
remedies.134 This is acknowledged by Langa,135 who argued as follows: 
It is therefore useful to have progressive international instruments leading the 
development towards an increased protection of fundamental human rights. 
                                                          
130  Langa 2009 NJHR 31. 
131  Simmons 2009 NJHR 65, 66-72; International NGO Coalition for OP-ICESCR 2013 
http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/1475393 3. 
132  Simmons 2009 NJHR 68. 
133  Evju 2009 NJHR 89. 
134  See ss 39(1), 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which require South 
African courts to take international law into account when interpreting the rights entrenched in 
the Constitution. For a further discussion in this regard, see Chenwi and Hardowar 2010 ESR 
Review 4. 
135  Langa 2009 NJHR 31. 
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International instruments can assist the courts in understanding human rights and 
influence governments to legislate effectively to protect human rights. 
So far South African courts have only sparingly utilised the jurisprudence emanating 
from the CESCR in the development of domestic socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence, with the courts emphasising that they do not have to follow the 
interpretive guidance of the CESCR.136 This is likely to change with the ratification of 
the ICESCR, the possible accession to the OP-ICESCR and the development of 
comparative international jurisprudence, with the effect that the courts will not only 
be inward-looking but will also look outwards to the more protective comparative 
jurisprudence emanating from the international level.137 This will ensure that socio-
economic rights are better protected at the national and international level. 
5.4  Acceding to the OP-ICESCR will not unduly encroach on South 
Africa's sovereignty and institutional integrity  
Sovereignty concerns, informed by unease about the integrity of national processes 
of adjudicating socio-economic rights, may be allayed by referring to the 
requirement that domestic remedies need to be exhausted before a communication 
will reach the CESCR, and, in particular, as article 4 stipulates, that the applicants 
have to show that they suffered a "clear disadvantage"; by the possibility, allowed 
for under article 7, of friendly settlement before the Committee; and by the 
complementary role of the CESCR in its individual communications mandate. The 
competence of the Committee is contoured by the restrictions of article 8(4) of the 
Optional Protocol, which enshrines the reasonableness approach in the adjudication 
of socio-economic rights at the international level. In this constrained role, the 
CESCR is, like any other judicial or quasi-judicial body, mandated to review only the 
reasonableness of the measures that have been put in place to enhance the 
realisation of socio-economic rights, respecting the State's margin of appreciation 
due to the plurality of the choices of measures that can be put in place to realise 
these rights. The CESCR is thus not mandated to dictate to States which measures 
to adopt or which macro-economic policies to adopt in order to enhance the 
                                                          
136  CHR and SAIFAC "Memorandum to the Department of Justice" para 6. 
137  See Van der Burg 2012 ESR Review 7. 
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realisation of socio-economic rights. This is acknowledged by Porter138 in his 
assessment of article 8(4), where he contends as follows: 
While the CESCR is directed by Article 8(4) not to shy away from adjudicating these 
critical claims, it is at the same time directed not to lose sight of the fact that its 
role is to focus on compliance with the ICESCR and on the fundamental values it 
protects. The CESCR will not, under the reasonableness review that is endorsed in 
Article 8(4), impose its own policy choices when other choices may be available and 
preferred as a means to ensure compliance with the ICESCR. It will not confuse its 
role with that of the respondent government or other institutions better placed to 
design and craft appropriate policies and programs. 
Accession to the Optional Protocol by South Africa will thus not detract from the 
sovereign mandate and responsibility of the relevant national government 
institutions to put in place specific measures aimed at the realisation of socio-
economic rights. On the contrary, all that a review under the Optional Protocol will 
do is to enhance State accountability for the realisation of the Covenant rights at the 
international level;139 encourage openness to a wide array of remedial options and 
engagement with relevant actors in the implementation of Covenant rights; and 
create new forms of institutional relationship between the government, international 
institutions and claimants of human rights in the realisation of socio-economic 
rights.140 
5.5  Acceding to the OP-ICESCR will not create extra onerous 
international human rights obligations for South Africa 
South Africa has ratified United Nations legal instruments creating individual 
complaint mechanisms, some of which already provide for at least some socio-
economic rights and allow for their adjudication by bodies with a status similar to 
that of the CESCR.141 South Africa's acceptance of these complaint mechanisms can 
                                                          
138  Porter 2009 NJHR 40-41. 
139  Simmons 2009 NJHR 65. 
140  Simmons 2009 NJHR 65. 
141  At the international level, international legal instruments with complaint mechanisms that South 
Africa has ratified or acceded to include: the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966); a declaration under a 14 of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) (CERD); a 22 of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) (CAT), 
and a 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(2006) (OP-CRPD). It has so far not acceded to two instruments with individual complaints 
mechanisms, being the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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hardly be said to have detracted from South Africa's sovereignty or its policy-making 
mandate in relation to the adoption of socio-economic policies for the realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national level. 
At the regional level South Africa has already accepted international complaints 
mechanisms adjudicating socio-economic rights.142 In fact, by accepting the 
jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the country has 
already accepted judicial adjudication of socio-economic rights. This is so because 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights incorporates the entire corpus of 
human rights, including socio-economic rights.143 While the African Charter creates a 
quasi-judicial mandate for the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to 
consider individual communications on claims for the violation of these rights,144 the 
Court provides for binding adjudication of these rights.145 In addition, South Africa is 
a state party to the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(the Women's Rights Protocol), which not only guarantees an even more extensive 
array of socio-economic rights,146 but also places the obligation on state parties to 
allocate spending on social welfare rather than on their military.147 
Although South Africa has ratified the African Charter, the Women's Rights Protocol 
and the Court Protocol, so far no socio-economic rights communications or cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Discrimination against Women (1999) (OP-CEDAW) and the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990) (MWC). 
142  At the regional level South Africa has ratified the following legal instruments providing for an 
individual communications mechanism: the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(1981); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990); the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003); and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998). 
143  African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) aa 15 (right to work), 16 (right to health), 
17 (right to education and cultural life), 18 (right to protection of the family) and 22 (right to 
economic, social and cultural development). 
144  African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) a 30 as read with aa 45-46. 
145  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998) a 1 as read with aa 2-3. 
146  Some of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) aa 12-24, include: education and 
training; equal opportunities in work and career advancement; health, including sexual and 
reproductive health; food security; adequate housing; and sustainable development. The African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) similarly contains a myriad of socio-
economic rights in aa 11-20, such as education, health, protection from child labour and 
exploitation, and the right to parental care. 
147  Article 10(3) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (2003). 
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have been filed against it either at the African Commission or the African Court. The 
lack of socio-economic rights communications against South Africa in these 
complaint mechanisms is unlikely to be due to a lack of knowledge of the existence 
of these mechanisms, but is more likely to be due to the fact that potential claimants 
see little added value in having recourse to these complaint procedures due to the 
adequacy of the available domestic remedies. This is likely to be unchanged even if 
South Africa accedes to the OP-ICESCR. 
Acceding to the Optional Protocol will thus not create more onerous obligations for 
South Africa above and above similar - and even more onerous - obligations it has 
already undertaken under these other legal instruments. It thus makes sense for 
South Africa to accede to the Optional Protocol, as ratification will re-affirm South 
Africa's commitment to a continued constructive engagement with treaty monitoring 
bodies at the regional and international level.  
5.6  Acceding to the OP-ICESCR will enhance national awareness and 
appreciation of socio-economic rights and the international 
mechanisms available for their enforcement 
Accession to the Optional Protocol is likely to enhance the overall understanding of 
socio-economic rights among South Africans, as the Optional Protocol obliges States 
to widely distribute and disseminate the ICESCR and the Optional Protocol itself, as 
well as the views and recommendations emanating from the CESCR under its 
individual communications procedure.148 Widespread knowledge of the Covenant, 
the Optional Protocol and other materials emanating from the CESCR at the national 
level would enhance domestic advocacy for the improved realisation of socio-
economic rights by individuals, groups as well as civil society organisations, with the 
effect that the national dialogue would be more inclusive and comprehensive. It 
would also improve the national civic monitoring and evaluation of the government's 
legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the realisation of socio-economic 
rights using international standards, with the result that the government's 
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accountability for the domestic implementation of socio-economic rights in South 
Africa would be enhanced.149 
6 Conclusion 
The adoption and the coming into force of the OP-ICESCR provides an important 
opportunity for the enhanced protection, promotion and full realisation of socio-
economic rights in line with the international law principle of the indivisibility, 
interrelatedness and interdependence of rights. In empowering the CESCR to 
consider individual communications and through its inquiry procedure, it provides an 
important avenue for the continued effort at the reduction of poverty by providing 
an opportunity for individuals and communities at the margins of society to attack 
poverty-enhancing violations of socio-economic rights at the international level. This 
was aptly captured by the former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise 
Arbour,150 who stated that the Optional Protocol: 
[w]ill provide an important platform to expose abuses that are often linked to 
poverty, discrimination and neglect, and that victims frequently endure in silence 
and helplessness. It will provide a way for individuals, who may otherwise be 
isolated and powerless, to make the international community aware of their 
situation. 
Accession to the Optional Protocol by South Africa may thus go a long way towards 
enhancing the protection of socio-economic rights at the national level, may improve 
the efforts to enhance substantive equality, to reduce poverty and improve 
standards of living, as well as to enhance the achievement of the transformative goal 
of the 1996 South African Constitution of transforming South Africa into an 
egalitarian and caring society. 
We believe that a strong case exists for South Africa's accession to the OP-ICESCR. 
In fact, it is difficult to conjure up credible or convincing counter-arguments. Logic 
impels too strongly that South Africa should confirm at the international level its 
                                                          
149  See Chenwi and Hardowar 2010 ESR Review 5, where they contend that "the OP-ICESCR 
promotes the culture of accountability and helps empower poor, vulnerable and marginal groups, 
and both of these objectives are encouraged by the South African Constitution". Also see 
Petherbridge 2012 http://blogs.sun.ac.za/seraj/files/2012/11/South-Africas-pending-ratification-
of-the-ICESCR.pdf. 
150  Arbour date unknown http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27069&Cr=arbour. 
F VILJOEN AND N ORAGO   PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2588 
position as a world leader on the national justiciability and legal enforcement of 
socio-economic rights, as, indeed, it has done during the drafting process of the 
Optional Protocol. 
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